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A growing body of recent macroeconomic evidence suggests that 
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volatility affects growth, however, are less clear; substantive evidence 
based on disaggregate data is almost non-existent. This paper offers a 
framework in which policy volatility has an adverse effect on firms’ entry 
into productive industries, thereby affecting economic growth. Empirical 
support for this relationship is based on a detailed dataset of thousands of 
firms from some 80 countries. Additional evidence is provided on the 
channels through which volatility affects firm growth, showing that 
institutional obstacles magnify the effect. 
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1. Introduction 
In contrast to the traditional view, recent research finds no evidence that policies per se 
are a significant predictor of economic performance, especially after controlling for 
proxies for institutional quality (see Easterly, 2005, for a summary). However, many 
researchers have suggested that volatility impairs investment and growth;
2 Aizenman and 
Marion (1993) and Fatas and Mihov (2006) explicitly focus on proxies for policy 
volatility in this regard.
3 Empirical support for this hypothesis has typically relied on 
cross-country evidence. Aghion et al. (2006) present evidence showing that the 
detrimental effect of policy volatility is especially strong in countries with a weak 
financial sector; in contrast, countries with a high level of financial development are less 
vulnerable and can successfully hedge off the effects of volatility. Using a different 
methodology, Hsieh and Parker (2006) reach the same conclusion. In contrast, Rodrik 
(1999), who focuses on external shocks to the world economy in the 1970s, argues that 
institutional strength insulates against the adverse effects of volatility. Consequently, the 
economic performance of countries with internal social conflicts, such as in Latin 
America, has suffered much more from the turbulence than countries with a stronger 
social structure, such as in East Asia. Fatas and Mihov (2006) present additional 
supporting evidence in this regard (see also the literature cited therein).
4   
The cross-country methodology employed in most of these papers, however, is far 
from ideal since the aggregate data captures too many factors that are difficult to isolate 
and disentangle. In particular, it is conceivable that volatility and growth are both 
affected by omitted variables, and the same is true with regard to the level of financial 
development. Thus, it is important to present complementary evidence that comes from 
more disaggregate data. This paper, therefore, focuses on the effects of volatility on firm 
growth. The growth of firms is considered a lead indicator of an economy’s strength, and 
as such has received a great deal of attention in the literature (Johnson et al., 2002; Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998; Beck et al., 2005, 2006).  
                                                           
2 See Aghion et al. (2006), Aizenman and Marion (1993, 1999), Easterly et al. (1993), Fatas and Mihov 
(2006), Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003), Kormendi and Meguire (1985), and Ramey and Ramey (1995). 
3 It should be noted that the distinction between an economy’s volatility and policy volatility is not very 
clear; for example, some authors use inflation or exchange rate volatility as proxies for both concepts.   
4 Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that volatility is not an independent cause, but is instead itself affected 
by institutional quality.   5
Our analytical framework suggests that volatility—interpreted here as the 
government’s inability to create credible policy commitments—affects firms’ decisions 
to enter into productive industries, leading to a negative relationship between volatility 
and firm growth. Furthermore, this effect is shown to be stronger under weak institutions, 
especially with high entry barriers. Using a large dataset of more than 10,000 firms from 
about 80 countries, we examine two hypotheses: that volatility is detrimental to growth, 
and that institutional obstacles magnify the effect. Our analysis relies upon self-reported 
information on firms’ perceptions of obstacles to their operations, following the lead of 
some earlier work, such as Johnson et al. (2002) and Beck et al. (2006). While the use of 
survey data has its limitations, this approach also has several advantages. First, it allows a 
disaggregate analysis of large data. Second, the relatively detailed account of the various 
obstacles enables us to compare the effect of volatility on growth to that of other 
perceived obstacles, such as financial and legal constraints, which were earlier addressed 
in the literature (Johnson et al., 2002, and Beck et al., 2006). Finally, it makes possible a 
relatively clean test of the channel—financial or institutional—through which volatility 
impacts growth. 
Based on the simple theoretical framework, the empirical analysis reveals that 
firms perceive volatility to be a significant obstacle to their growth, thus confirming one 
of the main conclusions of the aggregate studies. We then address the channel through 
which this occurs by interacting volatility measures with those of financial and 
institutional obstacles. We find that both channels matter, but that the institutional 
channel in particular retains predictive power even after controlling for the financial 
channel. Thus, in the last decades of the last century, Latin American countries 
experienced high volatility (Rodrik, 1999; Fatas and Mihov, 2006), as did several 
countries in East Asia (notably, South Korea). The latter’s economies, however—having 
a stronger institutional infrastructure—suffered much less from the volatility than the 
former. 
These findings complement the earlier literature in two respects. First, they 
confirm the importance of institutions for moderating the detrimental effect of volatility 
on growth, as has previously been studied in a cross-country framework (Fatas and 
Mihov, 2006). Additionally, they contribute to the emerging work that investigates 
obstacles to firm growth (Beck et al., 2005, 2006). A methodological remark is in order   6
here. The employed measure of volatility is subjective, being based on survey data. It can 
be argued, however, that it is precisely the subjective assessment of volatility that matters 
for firm decisionmaking with regard to entry, investment and, ultimately, growth; indeed, 
earlier work (Johnson et al., 2002; Beck et al., 2006) has related subjective assessments 
of various obstacles to firm growth. 
The roadmap of the paper is as follows. The next section lays out the analytical 
background for the empirical analysis. Section 3 contains the data description and the 
main empirical analysis, and Section 4 concludes.  
2. Background 
2.1  Previous Approaches 
Two theoretical approaches, with very different empirical implications, have featured in 
the literature on volatility and growth. One approach emphasizes the importance of 
finance and is exemplified in Aghion et al. (2006). The idea is that the allocation of 
resources between short-term investment, long-term investment (the latter being more 
productive but also riskier because of future volatility), and safe bonds is subject to 
budget constraints. In perfect credit markets, borrowing allows firms to employ a 
countercyclical investment policy, thus mitigating volatility effects. In contrast, when 
credit markets are imperfect, borrowing becomes very costly and, consequently, long-
term investment is procyclical, meaning that volatility increases while growth decreases. 
An empirical interpretation of this model is that volatility has an adverse effect on 
growth, especially when financial opportunities are limited. Indeed, the empirical test in 
Aghion et al. (2006), carried out on a panel of countries, establishes a negative 
relationship between the interactive term of volatility proxy and financial development on 
the one hand, and economic growth on the other. Moreover, Hsieh and Parker (2006) 
establish that the reduction in Chile’s tax rate in the mid-1980s was a leading factor 
behind subsequent growth in investment, and attribute it to the financial channel. Thus, 
this work stresses the significance of the financial channel as a mediator of the growth 
effects of volatility. 
A different theory is presented in Rodrik (1999) who maintains the growth effect 
of volatility is mediated through domestic social conflicts and institutional ability to   7
manage these conflicts.
5 The empirical implication is that the interactive term of volatility 
and institutional quality should have an effect on growth, and this indeed is shown in 
Rodrik (1999) to hold in the cross-country context. Specifically, by employing proxies 
for social tensions and for institutional quality, Rodrik (1999) shows that countries with 
lower levels of social conflict and with higher levels of institutional quality were much 
better able to cope with international crises in the 1970s than were countries with social 
tensions and weak institutions.   
While both lines of research are in agreement as to the adverse effect of volatility 
on growth, they differ in regard to the channel through which this effect materializes. The 
former emphasize the level of financial development while the latter emphasize the level 
of institutional quality. Whereas individual studies provide some evidence in support of 
the respective hypotheses, to the best of our knowledge no comprehensive work has 
compared the competing views.
6 Further, in a cross-country framework, such an exercise 
would be contaminated by additional potentially omitted variables, a situation that 
requires a more disaggregated analysis. To conduct such an analysis, we first present a 
simple theoretical framework that generates testable implications. 
2.2  Framework 
We now present a simple model whose empirical implications will be subsequently 
examined. The purpose of the model is to explicitly illustrate how firm growth can be 
affected by policy volatility and what role the institutional environment plays in this 
relationship. Therefore, we ignore the financial constraints that loom large in related 
work (Aghion et al., 2006, for example). In addition, the way institutional constraints are 
introduced is particularly suitable for the analysis of disaggregate firm growth, as 
opposed to Rodrik’s model (1999), for example, which focuses on country growth. 
Volatility here will be captured through the strategic policy uncertainty that firms face. 
Henisz (2004) contains a thorough discussion of how discretionary policymaking causes 
volatility and the aggregate growth consequences of such volatility (see also Fatas and 
Mihov, 2003, 2006, for related work). Specifically, Fatas and Mihov (2003) use explicit 
                                                           
5 In a related vein, Gradstein (2002) interprets institutional quality as the government’s ability to precommit 
to policies as opposed to discretionarily reacting to volatility, showing that policy commitment constitutes 
an insulation mechanism against shocks.   
6 Aghion et al. (2006) do include a proxy for property rights protection in their regressions, arguing that 
their financial channel remains robust.     8
proxies for discretionary decisionmaking as their volatility measures. This approach does 
not necessarily rule out the possible effects of statistical uncertainty, such as terms of 
trade, but it suggests that they ultimately work through domestic policies, such as the 
degree of trade openness, and that the credibility as opposed to the volatility of those 
policies plays a crucial role in the analysis. 
Specifically, suppose that firms, i, with a measure of one, produce output using 
capital k as the production factor. The firms can produce output in the official economy 
using advanced technology (which will for brevity’s sake be labeled as “industry”), or in 
the shadow economy using backward technology. The rental price of capital, r, will be 
assumed to be fixed, which is consistent with the assumption of an open economy. The 
firms differ with respect to their productivity parameters, and ai will denote firm i’s 
productivity parameter when acting officially; it is distributed according to a known 
density function h, h’ > 0. Letting aif(k) denote the production function, f’ > 0, f” < 0, and 
normalizing the output price to one, the firm’s operating profits are calculated as follows: 
Pi
 = ai f(k) – rk          ( 1 )  
These profits will be taxed. Letting T denote the tax rate, Pi
 (1-T) are after-tax 
operating profits. Further, entry into the industry is associated with the exogenous cost of 
C, which can be interpreted as fees and regulation costs, and is incurred up front; a higher 
C would imply a lower level of institutional quality. The negative macro consequences of 
entry costs have been recently well documented in Djankov et al. (2002). These 
assumptions imply that the net profits of a firm in the industry are given by: 
Pi
 (1-T) – C = [ai f(k) – rk]
 (1-T) – C    (2) 
Firms can avoid both the set-up costs, C, and taxes. They could, for example, 
move activities abroad where these are cheaper; they could cease operating as a business; 
or—our favored interpretation—they could go underground. It is assumed that this 
reduces their productivity, however. To further simplify matters, and without much loss 
of substance, the profits in this case are normalized to zero. Thus, industry production 
generates more output, whereas underground production is inferior in this regard. 
Firms make two types of decisions: whether to enter the industry, and—if so—
how much capital to employ. We denote N as the set of firms in the industry, and n as   9
their number. The government determines the tax rate T. This is assumed to maximize the 
tax revenue, R, less the excess burden cost of raising taxes. The latter will be assumed to 
be exogenously given φ(T), φ’, φ” > 0, and its interpretation is being related to designing, 
monitoring, and enforcing the tax collection mechanism.  
Since the tax revenue is given by: 




i i i rk k f a ] ) ( [        (3) 
the government’s objective function is as follows: 




i i i rk k f a ] ) ( [ -  φ(T     (4) 
The exact specification of the government’s objective function, particularly the 
relative weights of the tax revenues and the excess tax burden, is immaterial for the 
substance of the ensuing analysis. 
We distinguish between two regime types. Under the benchmark regime, the 
government has the ability to commit to the tax rate; firms’ decisions are then made 
subsequent to its determination. Alternatively, when there is policy volatility, the 
government determines the tax rate ex post the firms’ decisions, particularly after the 
firms have incurred entry costs. Thus, we interpret policy volatility as the lack of a 
credible policy commitment. 
2.3  Analysis 
Since an operating firm’s optimal choice of capital input maximizes (2), the first-order 
condition that equates marginal productivity to the rental price, 
ai  f’(k)  –  r  =  0       (5) 
determines the optimal amount of capital, ki = k(ai). Furthermore, the differentiation of 
(5) reveals that this is an increasing function, so that more productive firms make a larger 
capital investment.    10
2.3.1 Commitment Regime 
Under the commitment regime, the firms make their entry decisions knowing the tax rate 
T. It is easy to see that only sufficiently productive firms choose to enter the industry, 
where the break-even productivity level, a*, is given by: 
[a*f(k(a*)) – r k(a*)]
 (1-T) – C = 0      (6) 
Differentiating (6) we obtain:
7 
Proposition 1. Higher taxes and a weaker institutional environment decrease the 
number of firms entering the industry. Furthermore, the detrimental effect of 
taxes on firm entry is aggravated by a weak institutional environment. 
The detrimental growth effect of taxes, exacerbated in a weak institutional 
environment, then follows from the fact that industry productivity is relatively high. 
Cross-country evidence on the adverse effects of corporate taxes on growth is provided in 
Lee and Gordon (2005); Cullen and Gordon (2002), show more specifically that 
corporate taxes deter entrepreneurship. 
The government’s tax revenue then is: 
R = Td a a h rk k af
a a




−        (7) 
and the objective function is: 
G = Td a a h rk k af
a a
) ( ] ) ( [
* ∫
>
−  - φ(T)    (8) 
In other words, the government chooses the tax rate so as to maximize G while 
correctly anticipating the effect of its choice on firms’ decisions. While an increase in the 
tax rate increases the revenue collected from the firms that are expected to enter the 
industry, it also decreases the tax base by limiting entry (Proposition 1). Differentiation 
of (8) while employing the envelope theorem leads to the following first-order condition, 
which balances the above considerations while taking into account the excess tax burden: 
 
                                                           
7 The proofs are in the Appendix.   11
da a h rk k af
a a




− - [a*f(k(a*)) – r k(a*)]da*/dT - φ’(T) = 0  (9)  
Equations (6) and (9) thus determine equilibrium entry decisions and the tax rate. 
2.3.2 Lack of Commitment 
In this case, the tax rate choice cannot affect firms’ decisions. Maximization of (4) leads 
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Anticipating this, the firms then make their industry entry decisions. As before, only 
sufficiently productive firms enter; the cutoff, a**, is given by: 
[a**f(k(a**)) – r k(a**)]
 (1-T) – C = 0    (11) 





) ( ] ) ( [
a a
da a h rk k af  - φ’(T) = 0      (10’) 
Equations (10’) and (11) determine the equilibrium in this case. 
2.3.3 Comparison of Regimes 
Comparing the two regimes, the commitment regime given by (6) and (9) and the non-
commitment regime given by (10’) and (11), and employing the second-order conditions, 
we note that, given that C > 0, the commitment regime leads to a smaller tax rate than the 
non-commitment regime. The reason, of course, is that under the latter, the entry effect of 
taxation is taken into consideration, while under the former it is not. Recalling 
Proposition 1, this then implies that under the commitment regime, a larger fraction of 
firms enter the industry, hence the firm growth rate is higher. In contrast, when C = 0, 
there is no difference in outcomes between the two regimes. Thus, a weak institutional 
arrangement is essential for driving a wedge between the two regimes.  
We summarize these observations as follows: 
Proposition 2. With weak institutions, the commitment regime leads to a 
smaller tax rate and, consequently, to a larger fraction of firms entering the   12
industry than under the non-commitment regime. With strong institutions, C = 0, 
and the two regimes lead to identical outcomes. 
Recalling that industry production is more advantageous, this implies that policy 
volatility is detrimental to capital investment, firm growth, and profitability. We next 
proceed to empirically assess the implications of the link between volatility and growth. 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1  Data and Basic Statistics  
We use the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) data available at the World 
Bank website.
8 The sample consists of firm-level survey responses from more than 
10,000 firms in more than 80 large and small countries, many of them developing and in 
transition. The survey asked each business to rank the constraints or problems that 
affected their operations. This process involved an extensive questionnaire undertaken by 
means of a face-to-face interview with either the firm manager or firm owner of each 
company. As a result, the survey reports comparative measurements based on firms’ 
perceptions about the investment climate as shaped by economic policy, governance and 
corruption, regulation and taxes, infrastructure, public service quality, predictability of 
economic developments and policies, and financial constraints, as well as on firm size, 
growth, and other characteristics.  
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable    Source
Firms’ characteristics    
Sales growth in the last 
three years (%)  
Answer to the question: Please estimate the growth of your company’s 
sales over the past three years. 
Company is owned by a 
foreign investor 
Answer to the question on the nationality of the owners.  
Government owns the 
company 
Answer to the question on the ownership of the firm. 
Service The  firm  belongs  to the services sector. 
WBES
Macroeconomic context   
Log(GDP pc)  Logarithm of the average per capita GDP for the period 1995-1999. 
Expressed in constant 2000 US dollars. 
GDP growth (%)  Average GDP growth (%) for the period 1995-1999. 
WDI 
French legal origin  Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of 




                                                           
8 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/.   13
Table 1., continued 
 
Policy volatility     
Economic predictability Answer to the question: Do you regularly have to cope with unexpected 
changes in economic and financial policies which materially affect your 
business? Changes in economic and financial policies are: (1) completely 
predictable; (2) highly predictable; (3) fairly predictable; (4) fairly 
unpredictable; (5) highly unpredictable; (6) completely unpredictable. 
Policy  instability    Answer to the question: Please judge on a four point scale how 
problematic are the following factors for the operation and growth of
your business: Policy instability/uncertainty. (1) No obstacle; (2) Minor
obstacle; (3) Moderate obstacle; (4) Major obstacle. 
WBES
Institutions     
Judiciary   Answer to the question: Please judge on a four point scale how 
problematic are the following factors for the operation and growth of 
your business: Functioning of the judiciary. (1) No obstacle; (2) Minor 
obstacle; (3) Moderate obstacle; (4) Major obstacle. 
Corruption    Answer to the question: Please judge on a four point scale how 
problematic are the following factors for the operation and growth of 
your business: Corruption. (1) No obstacle; (2) Minor obstacle; (3) 
Moderate obstacle; (4) Major obstacle. 
Courts   Answer to the question: In resolving business disputes, do you believe 
your country’s court system to be affordable. (1) always, (6) never. 
WBES
Financial Constraints     
Financial obstacles  Answer to the question: Please judge on a four point scale how 
problematic are the following factors for the operation and growth of 
your business: Financing. (1) No obstacle; (2) Minor obstacle; (3) 




The survey, an initiative of the World Bank Group and its partner institutions, had 
the following objectives: (i) to provide feedback from enterprises on the state of the 
private sector in client countries; (ii) to measure the quality of governance and public 
services, including the extent of corruption; (iii) to provide better information on 
constraints to private-sector growth, from an enterprise perspective; (iv) to establish the 
basis for internationally comparable indicators that can track changes in the business 
environment over time, thus allowing for both competitive assessments and impact 
assessments of market-oriented reforms; and (v) to stimulate systematic public-private 
dialogue on business perceptions and the agenda for reform. The field work for the 
survey was carried out between 1999 and 2000 and consisted of private polling of firms 
that fulfilled the basic requirements regarding sector, size, location, and ownership 
characteristics.
9 The objective was to gather information on a sizeable number of firms in 
                                                           
9 The particular requirements that had to be filled by the selected sample were as follows. Sector: in each 
country, the sectoral composition in terms of manufacturing (including agro-processing) versus services   14
several countries around the world, an objective that was accomplished for most of the 
sample.
10 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Firms' characteristics                
Sales growth in the last three years (%)   6342  18.37  57.82  -100.00  900.00 
Company is owned by a foreign investor  6342  0.19  0.40  0.00  1.00 
Government owns the company  6342  0.88  0.33  0.00  1.00 
Service  6342 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Macroeconomic context       
Log(GDP) 6342  24.22  1.96  20.32  29.79 
GDP growth (%)  6342  3.43  4.17  -5.47  33.70 
French legal origin  6315 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Policy volatility       
Economic  predictability    5029 3.90 1.29 1.00 6.00 
Policy  Instability    5800 2.85 1.07 1.00 4.00 
Firm level institutions       
Corruption      5297 2.54 1.14 1.00 4.00 
Judiciary    4702 2.15 1.04 1.00 4.00 
Courts  5827 3.85 1.46 1.00 6.00 
Financial obstacles       
Financing    5909 2.82 1.11 1.00 4.00 
 
    
We merged the firm-level data obtained through the WBES with country-level 
control variables such as GDP per capita and growth, which were taken from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank, 2005). These variables were used as five-year 
averages in order to avoid capturing some noise due to the natural volatility of 
macroeconomic variables. Additionally, we used the origin of a country’s legal system as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(including commerce) will be determined by relative contribution to GDP, subject to a 15 percent minimum 
for each category. Size: at least 15 percent of the sample shall be in the small and 15 percent in the large 
size categories. Ownership: at least 15 percent of the firms will have foreign control. Exporters: at least 15 
percent of firms will be exporters, meaning that some significant share of their output is exported. 
Location: at least 15 percent of firms will be in the category “small city or countryside.” 
10 The countries and number of firms (in parentheses) included in the survey are: Cambodia (258), China 
(68), Indonesia (70), Malaysia (36), Philippines (84), Thailand (324), Albania (89), Armenia (95), 
Azerbaijan (68), Belarus (95), Bosnia (65), Bulgaria (99), Croatia (90), Czech Rep (72), Estonia (106), 
Georgia (77), Hungary (95), Kazakhstan (86), Kyrgyzstan (65), Lithuania (68), Moldova (83), Poland 
(167), Romania (96), Russia (378), Slovakia (86), Turkey (111), Ukraine (167), Uzbekistan (94), 
Bangladesh (34), India (135), Pakistan (56), Canada (68), France (56), Germany (59), Italy (56), Portugal 
(49), Spain (65), Sweden (71), United Kingdom (56), United States (65), Argentina (77), Belize (18), 
Bolivia (65), Brazil (133), Chile (71), Colombia (80), Costa Rica (52), Dominican Republic (76), Ecuador 
(47), El Salvador (48), Guatemala (53), Haiti (46), Honduras (46), Mexico (38), Nicaragua (56), Panama 
(48), Peru (66), Trinidad and Tobago (60), Uruguay (56), Venezuela (57), and the West Bank-Gaza (27).   15
a country institutional proxy. As has become customary in the literature, we distinguish 
between French and non-French legal origins and use them as dummy variables. The 
questions used as proxies of policy volatility, financial obstacles, and institutions as well 
as all other variables employed in this paper are described in Table 1. Table 2 contains 
descriptive statistics and Table 3 presents a basic correlation matrix with corresponding 
p-values. 
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Corruption Courts  Judiciary 
0.049                                 Company is owned by 
a foreign investor  0.000                    
0.018 0.015                     Government owns the 
company 
0.192 0.287                    
Services  0.015 -0.053  0.075                  
  0.264 0.000  0.000                  
Log (GDP)  0.044 0.080  0.101  0.049                
  0.001 0.000  0.000  0.000                
GDP growth (%)  0.088 0.046  -0.011  -0.003  -0.204             
  0.000 0.001  0.409  0.827  0.000             
French legal origin  -0.080 0.087  0.141 0.036  0.123  0.017            
  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.005  0.000  0.178            
Economic predictability   -0.020 -0.078  0.029 -0.013 -0.024 -0.109 -0.111           
  0.158 0.000  0.040 0.345  0.086  0.000  0.000           
-0.071 -0.059  0.042 0.002  0.004  -0.107 0.072  0.197          Policy Instability 
0.000 0.000  0.001 0.868  0.749  0.000  0.000 0.000         
-0.043 -0.038  0.097 -0.046 -0.137 -0.036 0.107  0.071  0.392        Corruption  
0.002 0.006  0.000 0.001  0.000  0.009  0.000 0.000 0.000       
-0.054 -0.001  0.012 -0.017 -0.032 -0.018 0.130  0.071  0.368 0.551      Judiciary  
0.000 0.946  0.420 0.244  0.026  0.222  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000    
Courts   -0.047 -0.018  0.113 0.030  0.083  0.026 0.044  0.067  0.116 0.122  0.191   
  0.000 0.174  0.000 0.020  0.000  0.045  0.001 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  
-0.060 -0.159  -0.053 -0.089 -0.053 -0.098 -0.039  0.102  0.214  0.262  0.016  0.179  Financing 
0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.230  0.000 
      
     Note: p-values in second row. 
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3.2  Results  
We first run a simple specification, running firm sales growth on volatility proxies and additional 
firm-level and macro-level controls.
11 The analysis focuses on two volatility proxies: economic 
predictability and policy instability. The results, using country fixed effects and random effects, 
are shown in Table 4.   
 
Table 4. Policy Volatility and Firm Growth 
  Firm Sales growth (%) 
  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
7.644 6.099  7.818  6.515  Company is owned by a foreign 
investor  (2.64)** (2.54)** (2.71)*** (2.69)*** 
8.572 8.916  7.968  8.793  Government owns the company 
(2.03)** (2.41)**  (1.93)*  (2.45)** 
3.076 4.096  2.568  3.413  =1 if company belongs to the 
service sector 
(1.60) (2.41)**  (1.30)  (1.91)* 
   3.111  -0.046  Log GDP per capita 
 
   (2.02)**  (0.04) 
GDP growth (%)      1.687  1.618 
     (6.05)***  (7.19)*** 
French Legal origin      -10.503  -9.479 
     (3.03)***  (3.09)*** 
Policy Volatility        
Economic predictability   -1.798    -1.554   
 (2.65)**    (2.40)**   
 -2.544    -2.774  Policy instability 
 (2.32)**    (2.79)*** 
Constant 13.457  13.766  -15.205  12.429 
 (3.06)***  (4.11)***  (1.07)  (1.12) 
Observations 5102  5874  5003  5776 
Number of countries  62  81  60  79 
R-sq overall  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.02 
R-sq within  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
R-sq between  0.02  0.01  0.29  0.24 
ρ  0.08 0.09  0.04  0.05 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) 
significant at 10 percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
                                                           
11 The specification employed here loosely follows Beck et al. (2005). When using broad variations of the 
specification employed in this paper, we obtain very similar results.   18
Both economic unpredictability and policy instability as perceived by the firms have a 
statistically significant negative effect on sales growth. Among firm-level characteristics, foreign 
ownership matters and is associated with a higher rate of sales growth. Government-owned firms 
seem also to have grown faster, although the findings here are not as robust.
12 Country-level 
economic growth is positively related to firm growth, and the legal origin variable is significant 
too; countries whose legal system is rooted in the French tradition have a slower rate of firm 
growth.  
Volatility appears to be not only statistically significant, but also economically 
meaningful. Thus, a one-level increase in the scale of economic unpredictability decreases firm 
growth by about 1.5 percent; and a similar increase in political instability is associated with a 
growth drop of more than 3 percent. It is noteworthy that the explicit perception of policy 
instability has an even stronger association with firm growth than economic predictability. These 
results are generally consistent with those in the earlier literature, for example, Aizenman and 
Marion (1993, 1999), Fatas and Mihov (2006), and Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003), who discern 
the detrimental growth effects of volatility in cross-country contexts. 
 
     
                                                           
12 In some specifications, not reported here, firm age (years since it was established) is negatively associated with 
firm growth, implying that younger firms grow faster than older ones.     19




Our next step then is to determine the channel through which volatility affects growth. As 
discussed above, the two main channels suggested by the theoretical analyses as well as by some 
macroeconomic evidence are the financial channel and the institutional channel. Consequently, 
we now add to our basic specification measures representing each of these two channels, as well 
as corresponding interactive terms with our volatility proxies. We first study the institutional link 
by using a perception proxy on the quality of the judiciary, which we believe encompasses the 
 
 
  Firm Sales growth (%) 
  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
7.899 6.497  8.330  7.055  Company is owned by a foreign 
investor  (2.51)** (2.48)**  (2.62)***  (2.65)*** 
8.485 9.047  7.847  8.945  Government owns the company 
(1.83)* (2.21)**  (1.74)*  (2.27)** 
3.617 4.543  3.036  3.827  =1 if company belongs to the service 
sector (1.99)*  (2.76)***  (1.60)  (2.19)** 
Log GDP per capita      2.745  -0.447 
     (1.74)*  (0.35) 
GDP growth (%)      1.700  1.734 
     (5.25)***  (6.98)*** 
French Legal origin      -10.436  -9.895 
     (2.80)***  (3.02)*** 
Policy Volatility        
1.185   1.515    Economic predictability  
(0.73)   (0.97)   
 -0.107    -0.111  Policy Instability 
 (0.05)    (0.05) 
Institutional quality        
2.992 2.732  3.363  2.991  Judiciary  
(1.09) (1.41)  (1.32)  (1.58) 
-1.157   -1.192    Econ Predict.* Judiciary 
(1.98)**   (2.09)**   
 -1.175    -1.236  Policy instability* Judiciary 
 (1.76)*    (1.88)** 
Constant 4.829  9.039  -21.008  9.553 
 (0.47)  (1.82)*  (1.28)  (0.82) 
Observations 4548  5203  4451  5106 
Number of countries  62  80  60  78 
R-sq overall  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03 
R-sq within  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
R-sq between  0.01  0.02  0.26  0.25 
ρ  0.09 0.09  0.04  0.05 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) 
significant at 10 percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent 
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general institutional constraints faced by firms.
13 The inclusion of these variables results in both 
volatility proxies losing their statistical significance.
14  However, the interactive terms of 
economic predictability and policy volatility with the institutional variable are all statistically 
significant at conventional levels, suggesting that the adverse growth effect of volatility is 
mediated through institutional quality.
15 These findings are shown in Table 5. 
 
Table 6. Policy Volatility, Institutional Quality, Financial Obstacles  
and Firm Growth: Interactive Terms 
 
  Firm Sales growth (%) 
  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
6.650 5.728  6.901  6.212  Company is owned by a foreign investor 
(2.17)** (2.24)**  (2.20)**  (2.35)** 
7.629 8.648  6.838  8.408  Government owns the company 
(1.68)* (2.13)**  (1.55)  (2.15)** 
3.367 4.135  2.758  3.334  =1 if company belongs to the service sector 
(1.86)* (2.50)**  (1.47)  (1.90)* 
Log GDP per capita      2.314  -0.734 
     (1.43)  (0.56) 
GDP growth (%)      1.568  1.609 
     (4.88)***  (6.56)*** 
French Legal origin      -10.022  -9.792 
     (2.72)***  (2.98)*** 
Policy Volatility        
3.085   3.187    Economic predictability  
(1.19)   (1.18)   
 -0.859    -0.851  Policy Instability 
 (0.32)    (0.32) 
Institutional quality        
3.108 3.264  3.385  3.687  Judiciary  
(1.13) (1.66)  (1.34)  (1.64) 
Financial Constraints        
-0.600 -3.864  -0.938  -4.079  Financial obstacles 
(0.23) (1.79)*  (0.35)  (1.82)* 
-1.013   -1.039    Econ. Predict.* Judiciary 
(1.73)*  (1.84)**   
 -1.234    -1.350  Policy instability* Judiciary 
 (1.82)*    (2.02)** 
-0.711   -0.632    Econ Predict.* Financial obstacles 
(1.01)   (0.86)   
 0.528    0.549  Policy instability* Financial obstacles 
 (0.78)    (0.80) 
 
                                                           
13 The role of the judiciary as a crucial variable in the performance of countries has been recently stressed by La 
Porta et al. (2004) and Djankov et al. (2003). The definition of this variable is shown in Table 1.  
14 In the case of economic predictability, the sign switches but, as mentioned in the text, the corresponding 
coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
15 The institutional term switches sign but is not statistically significant.   21
Table 6., continued         
Constant 6.170  17.413  -14.620  20.927 
 (0.50)  (2.47)**  (0.75)  (1.45) 
Observations 4454  5119  4358  5023 
Number of countries  62  80  60  78 
R-sq overall  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.03 
R-sq within  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
R-sq between  0.00  0.01  0.25  0.26 
ρ  0.08 0.09  0.04  0.04 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) significant at 
10 percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. 
 
These results seem to suggest, therefore, that strong institutional quality, as measured by 
the functioning of the judiciary, ameliorates the generally negative effect of volatility on firm 
growth. Since much of the earlier work underscores the importance of the financial channel in 
this regard, it is interesting to see whether the institutional channel retains its significance in the 
presence of the financial variables. Hence, in Table 6, the volatility proxies are interacted not 
only with the proxies for institutional obstacles but also with those for financial constraints. This 
latter variable is measured by the extent to which firms perceive that financial obstacles impede 
firm development and growth.
16 As can be seen, our interacted institutional proxy retains its 
statistical significance, whereas the policy volatility-interacted financial variable yields a 
coefficient that is never statistically significant at conventional levels (and sometimes yields the 
wrong sign), suggesting that institutional quality may even trump the importance of the financial 
channel. In fact, it appears that, whereas the link between institutions and firm growth is 
essentially given through the interactions between institutions and policy volatility and far less 
through a direct institutional channel, the financial variable appears to have a direct effect on 
firm sales growth, but not through interactions with policy volatility. This is reflected by the fact 
that the financial obstacle term in the regressions tends to be statistically significant, but the 
corresponding interactive term with policy volatility never is. On the contrary, the institutional 
variable is never statistically significant, but the interactive term is always significant at 
conventional levels. 
  
                                                           
16 This variable has been employed in previous empirical research on financial constraints. See Beck et al. (2005). 
The definition of this variable is shown in Table 1.    22




Predictability    
Policy 
Instability    
Panel A         
(i) Policy Volatility*Judiciary  -1.74    -1.89   
 (-2.82)  *** (-1.66)  * 
Overall Effect  -1.30    -3.44   
 (-1.86)  *  (-2.40)  ** 
(ii) Policy Volatility*Corruption  -1.19    -1.24    
 (-2.09)  ** (-1.88)  * 
Overall Effect  -1.46    -3.24   
 (-2.02)  ** (-2.95)  *** 
(iii) Policy Volatility*Courts  0.11    -0.98   
 (0.26)    (-2.44)  ** 
Overall Effect  -1.42    -2.62   
 (-2.14)  ** (-2.60)  *** 
        
Panel B         
(i) Policy Volatility*Judiciary  -1.72     -1.96    
 (-2.65)  *** (-1.77)  * 
Overall Effect  -1.09    -2.75   
 (-1.52)    (-2.27)  ** 
(ii) Policy Volatility*Corruption  -1.04     -1.35    
 (-1.84)  *  (-2.02)  ** 
Overall Effect  -1.20    -2.70   
 (-1.66)  *  (-2.70)  *** 
(iii) Policy Volatility*Courts  0.02     -0.94    
  (0.04)    (-2.22)  ** 
Overall Effect  -1.31    -2.08   
 (-1.87)  *  (-2.24)  ** 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clusters in each country; (*) 
significant at 10 percent; (**) significant at 5 percent; (***) significant at 1 percent. Results 
in Panel A are based on the same random effects specification employed in Table 5. Results 
in Panel B are based on the same random effects specification employed in Table 6. The 
overall effects are evaluated at the mean of the corresponding variable. 
 
 
We further pursue the above analysis by testing the robustness of our findings to changes 
in institutional proxies.
17 In particular, we employ two additional variables, corruption and 
affordability of courts, which we believe are also consistent with the underlying rationale of the 
model. In this case, and for the sake of economy, we do not present the full regression results but 
                                                           
17 We also tested a broad array of financial variables. Remarkably, we obtain very similar results. Furthermore, in 
order to further test the robustness of our findings, we tested a broad array of different specifications and included 
other variables such as GDP growth, economic sectors, inflation, terms of trade, and openness. In fact, our results do 
not change. All these additional results are available upon request.   23
focus only on the coefficients of our variables of interest as well as on the overall effects on firm 
sales growth. Our findings are shown in Table 7. When replicating the specification of Table 5 
(without financial variables), we find that regardless of the institutional and volatility proxies 
employed, the interactive term between policy volatility and institutions is almost always 
negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, the overall effects of 
policy volatility on firm growth are negative and statistically significant regardless of the 
institutional proxy employed. This is shown in Panel A. Similarly, when replicating the 
specification of Table 6 (with financial variables and interactions), we also find that the 
interactive term between institutions and volatility tends to be negative and statistically 
significant in most cases. The corresponding overall effect of policy volatility on firm growth is 
also statistically significant.
18 These results are shown in Panel B in Table 7. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper contributes to the literature on volatility and growth in three ways. First, it provides 
an analytical framework that identifies the effect of policy volatility on firm growth. Then, using 
unique firm-level survey data, it empirically establishes the existence of such an effect, thus 
reinforcing the extant macroeconomic findings. Finally, it theorizes that weak institutions 
magnify the detrimental growth effect of volatility and finds preliminary support in the data for 
this hypothesis. These findings complement the existing macroeconomic literature that also 
identifies volatility as an impediment to growth. While underscoring the significance of 
institutional quality in mediating this relationship, this paper also complements work that 
emphasizes the financial channel. 
In this paper, volatility is a somewhat generic term, although an attempt is made to 
distinguish between economic and policy volatility. Future research would hopefully shed further 
light on what specific aspects of volatility are especially detrimental for growth.   
                                                           
18 Unlike the very few available firm-level growth studies, we apply an instrumental variables approach using the 
following instruments: (i) number of recessions and black market premium as instruments for policy volatility; (ii) 
number of bank bankruptcies as an instrument for financial constraints, and (iii) ethnolinguistic fractionalization and 
continental dummies as instruments for institutional quality. While not perfect instruments, they do pass 
overidentifying restriction tests. Applying the corresponding instrumental variables approach in both fixed effects 
and random effects gives similar results to the ones presented here. In particular, the interactive terms between 
institutions and firm growth remain negative and statistically significant. Also, when using national-level 
institutional variables such as the well-known ICRG index (Knack and Keefer, 1995), we obtain results very similar 
results to those shown here. All variables are from the World Bank (2005). We would be glad to provide these 
additional results upon request.    24
Appendix 
1. Proof of Proposition 1 
Differentiating (6) we obtain: 
∂a*/∂T = [a*f(k(a*)) – r k(a*)]
 /[ f(k(a*))(1-T)] > 0    (A1) 
and 
∂a*/∂C = 1
 /[ f(k(a*))(1-T)]  >  0     (A2) 
and 
∂
2a*/∂T ∂C = - [f’(dk/da*)(1-T) - f]
 /[ f(k(a*))(1-T)]
2 > 0  (A3) 
Thus, the fraction of entering firms, n = 1-h(a*), decreases in T and in C; and the sensitivity of 
entry with respect to T increases in C. 
2. Proof of Proposition 2 
For C > 0, comparing (9) and (10’), we observe that the left-hand side in the latter exceeds that in 
the former. Since the second-order conditions imply that these respective expressions decrease in 
T, we obtain the result that the tax rate is smaller under the commitment regime. Since the only 
difference between equations (6) and (11) determining firms’ entry is the tax rate, it follows from 
Proposition 1 that a* < a**, so that fewer firms enter the industry under the non-commitment 
regime, which in turn implies slower overall growth. In contrast, when C = 0, entry is costless, 
and a choice of tax rate does not affect the firms’ decisions to enter.   25
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